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Negotiations Resume
by Annalisa Savaresi*
The Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee for a Legally Binding Agreement 
on Forests in Europe (INC-Forests4) convened in Warsaw, 
Poland, 10–14 June 2013. INC-Forests4 was meant to 
be the last session to finalise “a holistic, legally binding 
framework forest agreement” (LBA), strengthening 
cooperation between the States of the European continent, 
to be considered, and possibly adopted and opened 
for signature, at an extraordinary FOREST EUROPE 
Ministerial Conference to be held by the end of 2013.1 
The delegates from 33 countries present in Warsaw, 
however, did not manage to reach an agreement on 
all outstanding issues for negotiation. After prolonged 
consultations, the session was suspended until a later date 
(place to be determined). This report reviews progress 
achieved at INC-Forests4, summarising the issues that 
remain outstanding.
Progress in Warsaw
When it opened, INC-Forests4 was expected to work 
pursuant to an ambitious negotiation agenda, including the 
finalisation of the text of the LBA and arrangements for 
its presentation to the extraordinary FOREST EUROPE 
Ministerial Conference. Negotiations largely centred 
around the finalisation of the LBA draft negotiating text, 
which had come to Warsaw in a relatively advanced stage 
of drafting. 
At the conclusion of the resumed session of INC-
Forests3 (St Petersburg, April 2013), delegates had agreed 
to substantially restructure the text, following a proposal 
by the Swiss Federation. Some portions of text had been 
agreed ad referendum, including the preamble, as well as 
some substantive provisions (for example, those addressing 
the productive functions of forests). Most sections of the 
negotiating text, however, remained in a bracketed form, 
including several that have fundamental implications for 
the scope of the agreement – such as the definition of forest, 
and forests’ contribution to global carbon cycles – as well 
as crucial operational arrangements, including naming 
the institution(s) that will act as depositary and/or provide 
secretariat services.
In Warsaw, delegates made substantive progress on 
most elements of the negotiating text, working in plenary, 
and in informal contact groups, aided by a legal expert 
group established in St Petersburg. By the time it was 
decided to recess INC-Forests4 pending later resumption, 
the draft negotiating text included a preamble, 27 
articles, and two annexes (on arbitration and conciliation, 
respectively).
The preamble of the draft negotiating text was entirely 
agreed ad referendum, including references to the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development2 and the 
main international instruments directly and indirectly 
dealing with forests. It therefore recognises the importance 
of international cooperation and sustainable forest 
management (SFM) in implementing the decisions taken 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
(including the Aichi Biodiversity Targets), the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.3 
These references may be regarded as an expression of 
the intention not to significantly depart from the body of 
international instruments dealing with forests, particularly 
those recognised within the framework of FOREST 
EUROPE.4 The preamble also mentions the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
acknowledging its relevance.5 This recognition may be 
regarded as particularly significant in light of the vast 
body of international and regional human rights law on the 
rights of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent 
communities in relation to forests and their resources.
Prior to recessing, INC-Forests4 was able to adopt 
most substantive articles of the drafting negotiating text ad 
referendum, and to get past the controversies concerning 
terms and definitions. The definition of forest that was 
agreed in Warsaw builds upon the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s (FAO’s) definition, but leaves States free to 
apply their national definitions, so long as the Secretariat 
is duly informed of this choice and of the definition to be 
applied.6 This compromise solution potentially leaves the 
door open for considerable difference in interpretation 
among the Parties, regarding the object of the LBA. The 
section on definitions also includes a definition of “illegal 
harvesting”,7 reflecting an apparently definitive departure 
from the use of the term “illegal logging”, which appeared 
in earlier editions of the draft negotiating text.
In outlining the principles that parties must respect 
when implementing the LBA, the draft acknowledges that 
each party is responsible for SFM on its territory and for 
the development and implementation of policies that are 
“adequate to its respective national conditions and needs”.8 
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The principles also provide that the Convention is intended 
to reinforce and strengthen the implementation of SFM “in 
a way that is mutually supportive with existing rights and 
obligations under other multilateral agreements relevant to 
this Convention”.9 This clause, which appears in several 
MEAs, constitutes a further expression of the negotiators’ 
intention to align the LBA with extant instruments.
As stated in the draft, the LBA’s objectives are wide-
ranging in scope, including strengthening SFM; enhancing 
the contribution of forests and forestry to the solution of 
global challenges; and maintaining, protecting, restoring and 
enhancing forests’ health, productivity, biodiversity, vitality 
and resilience, and capacity to adapt to climate change and 
combat desertification.10 The text further mentions the need 
to ensure that forests contribute effectively to sustainable 
development.11
In a late-night session Courtesy: IISD-Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
Although ambitious, these objectives are not coupled 
with an equally ambitious set of obligations. In fact, the 
substantive provisions of the LBA are broadly worded in 
a manner typical of framework conventions, setting out a 
series of objectives and principles, but leaving the definition 
of more concrete obligations to subsequent instruments. In 
further indication of this approach, the draft negotiating 
text specifically contemplates the adoption of protocols.12 
Regarding SFM, the draft mandates that parties take 
measures to ensure that SFM be implemented in a manner 
that takes into account the implementing country’s specific 
forest conditions and national priorities.13 It identifies 
a set of rather general criteria for SFM, and requires 
parties to develop, implement and update national forest 
programmes or equivalents, making explicit reference to 
Vienna Resolution 1.14 Parties to the LBA are also required 
to strengthen and enhance international cooperation and 
coordination to foster coherence and avoid duplication 
of or overlap with the work of relevant international 
agreements.15 
The substantive obligations of parties are encapsulated 
in a series of provisions agreed ad referendum concerning 
forests’ contribution to global carbon cycles; forest health 
and vitality; forest biodiversity; and forests’ productive, 
protective and socio-economic functions.16 These 
provisions are hardly ground-breaking, instead reiterating 
commitments found in other international and FOREST 
EUROPE instruments. 
INC-Forests4 rejected an important suggestion by 
Iceland that the text should include a mention of deforestation 
in its provision concerning forests’ contribution to global 
carbon cycles.17 Although deforestation is not seen as 
significantly affecting the continent of Europe, a provision 
addressing it in the context of the LBA could have had 
important international trade implications, and led to 
innovative developments, if the LBA were ever opened 
for accession by non-European States. 
The remainder of the negotiating text deals with 
operational matters, establishing the Conference of the 
Parties (CoP), Secretariat, and Compliance Committee; and 
providing mechanisms for the settlement of disputes. INC-
Forests4 delegates could not reach an agreement prior to 
recessing the session on how to finalise the text concerning 
these issues and the related text remains partially bracketed. 
Delegates also started drafting a document by which the 
final draft agreement would be presented to ministers 
at the Extraordinary FOREST EUROPE Ministerial 
Conference.18 The text however remains at an early stage 
of drafting, pending decisions on fundamental operational 
arrangements – the selection of institution(s) that will be 
acting as depositary and/or providing secretariat services.
Outstanding Issues
Agreement on the institution(s) that will serve as 
the depositary and/or host for the Convention and that 
will provide secretariat services proved to be the most 
controversial issue on the negotiating table in Warsaw. 
Pursuant to the Oslo Mandate, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), FAO, the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
the European Forest Institute (EFI) have jointly serviced 
the INC-Forests process.19 Their mandate, however, does 
not provide any indication as to which institution ought to 
provide secretariat services and serve as depositary once 
the LBA has been adopted. 
This matter had already been debated at length in earlier 
INC-Forests sessions, where delegates agreed to bring the 
LBA under the UN umbrella.20 This preliminary decision 
however did not go so far as to definitively identify the 
institution(s) that would directly service the LBA.
In Warsaw, Chair Jan Heino explained that for the 
LBA to be adopted under the UN umbrella, either the 
FAO Director-General or the UN Secretary-General 
would have to act as depositary.21 With regard to the 
institutions performing secretariat functions, the main 
options were either the FAO or UNECE or both, possibly 
with the support of UNEP.22 During the Warsaw session, 
delegates heard representatives from the UNECE and FAO 
exchanging views and making their cases for selecting their 
respective agencies as host for the LBA Secretariat. In this 
process, the European Union re-opened another option – 
that of involving the EFI in servicing the Secretariat. The 
Swiss Federation proposed that the Secretariat be hosted in 
Geneva, creating competition for the candidature of Bonn, 
which had been put forward by Germany at INC-Forests3. 
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The largely political decision over these institutional 
questions is of some consequence for the future of the 
LBA, with regard to both the adoption process, and the 
prospects for opening the LBA to States outside Europe.23 
The implications of the choice were identified in a paper 
circulated by Switzerland at INC-Forests3, and re-
circulated in Warsaw, as well as in the numerous documents 
analysed at earlier INC-Forests sessions.24 The emergence 
of institutional jealousies is unsurprising, as this type of 
wrangling has historically characterised the evolution (and 
lack thereof) of the international regime on forests. 
Given that a decision on institutional matters was 
integral to most of the remaining outstanding questions 
in this negotiation, Chair Heino personally conducted 
informal consultation on the issue for much of the week. 
Unfortunately, little progress was made, and the text of the 
negotiating draft remains largely non-finalised. 
Delegates could also not agree on how to finalise other 
portions of the draft negotiating text, from the title of 
the agreement to its rules on voting and the Compliance 
Committee. The name debate ultimately revolves around 
the still open option of allowing accession by non-European 
countries. The title will presumably either indicate that the 
instrument is international, or emphasise its more regional/
European focus. 
A thornier question related to voting and the treatment 
of regional economic integration organisations.25 The 
delegates of Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine expressed support 
for limiting the exercise of the right to vote by regional 
economic integration organisations to those of their 
member States present in each session of the CoP.26 This 
suggestion was opposed by the EU, which argued that 
it was contrary to established practice under numerous 
international environmental agreements, including the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the CBD and the UNECE 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (Aarhus Convention).27 Switzerland objected that 
the recently negotiated Minamata Convention28 may be 
interpreted as a move away from this practice, but the EU 
disagreed with this interpretation. The struggle over the 
right to vote is ultimately a political one between the EU 
and the non-European States, which are understandably 
reluctant to grant the EU an automatic voting majority 
at CoP sessions. No compromise on the issue could be 
reached in Warsaw and it is going to be interesting to see 
how delegates will address this important question at the 
resumed session of INC-Forests4. 
Other outstanding matters include the establishment 
of the Compliance Committee; and the admission of 
observers to the CoP.29 As it stands, the LBA text requires 
parties to monitor and report to the CoP on their progress 
in implementing SFM and on measures taken to implement 
the LBA.30 In Warsaw, delegates abandoned the idea of 
an expert mechanism to review parties’ reports, opting 
instead to entrust the Secretariat to “review, analyse, 
compile and report” information submitted by parties on 
the status and development of forests and progress in the 
implementation of SFM, drawing upon “the necessary 
technical expertise”.31 Delegates also agreed that a 
“facilitative, non-confrontational, transparent, cooperative 
and recommendatory” Compliance Committee should be 
established.32 This text remains bracketed, however, with 
regard to the information that the Compliance Committee 
may consider in carrying out its functions.33 Some delegates 
suggested that the Committee should be authorised to 
consider “any information it deems credible and relevant”, 
while others preferred a more restrictive approach.34 The 
election of the members of the Compliance Committee and 
adoption of its terms of reference and rules of procedure by 
consensus were also subject to some debate and that text, 
too, remains bracketed.35 
Questions concerning the role of observers and public 
participation have emerged both in connection with the 
work of the Compliance Committee and attendance at 
CoP sessions. In Warsaw, the Russian Federation rejected 
suggestions that Committee members might be drawn also 
from stakeholder organisations and that such organisations 
might make submissions to the Compliance Committee. 
Thus, the text concerning the admission of observers at 
CoP sessions remains bracketed.36 As it stands, therefore, 
the LBA’s stance on public participation issues is rather 
far from progressive. 
Conclusion
In Warsaw, delegates managed to make substantive 
progress on numerous matters, although consensus often 
entailed a significant lowering of the level of ambition 
reflected in the draft LBA. The negotiating text that 
emerged prior to the recess of INC-Forests4 is thus the 
result of a careful compromise, whereby delegates agreed 
on largely uncontroversial principles and objectives, 
without significantly raising the bar already reflected in 
the array of existing international and regional instruments 
dealing with forests. Arguably, it is the law-making process 
itself that is most interesting, given that it provides for the 
first time a platform to formalise a vast body of informal and 
soft-law forest instruments into a unitary, legally binding 
instrument. Viewed in this way, the fact that the process 
stumbled over issues that are largely procedural in nature, 
and do not really have much to do with forests, is seen 
to be less significant. These issues remain outstanding, 
reminiscent of controversies that have historically affected 
international processes dealing with forests. 
It remains to be seen whether the resumed session of 
INC-Forests4 will manage to reach compromise on the 
institutional questions that are hampering the process. The 
INC-Forests Bureau indicated that the resumed session will 
take place in Switzerland, 6–8 November 2013. With the 
extraordinary FOREST EUROPE Ministerial Conference 
to be held by the end of 2013, however, the clock is ticking 
fast for INC-Forests.
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Proposed Marine Protected Areas
– Voted Down Again –
For more than a year, New Zealand, in company with 
the US, has sought a declaration by the Commission for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) that would designate large expanses of the 
Ross Sea (see Figure 1) as a marine sanctuary. The proposal 
would have designated a total area in excess of 2.3 million 
km2 for protection, which would have created the world’s 
largest marine protected area (MPA) to date. Rejected in 
CCAMLR’s annual meeting in 2012, the proposal was 
forwarded to a special meeting held in Bremerhaven, 
Germany this July, where a second MPA proposal (from 
Australia, France and the European Union) proposing less 
stringent protective measures for a cluster of seven MPAs 
in east Antarctica, covering about 1.63 million km2, was 
also submitted.
In preparation for the Bremerhaven meeting, the 
proposals were broadly publicised. The Ross Sea proposal 
was described by its proponents as having been designed 
to “safeguard seals, penguins and fish in vast swathes 
of water through protected zones in the Ross Sea and 
eastern Antarctica [and] also create special research zones 
for scientists to monitor the impact of increased human 
activity and climate change on this isolated region”. 
Ultimately, both the proposed protections are, in essence, 
fishing restrictions. Although relatively strict, however, 
both proposals would have allowed fishing for Patagonian 
toothfish (marketed as Chilean sea bass) – an activity that 
has been highly controversial, when considered in other 
environmental forums.
When first presented to CCAMLR, a body that must 
make its decisions by consensus, the Ross Sea proposal was 
not approved. Reports indicated that a number of countries, 
including Russia and China, were uncomfortable with 
the extent of the fishing restrictions. Nonetheless, during 
preparations for Bremerhaven, Andrea Kavanagh, director 
of the Southern Ocean Sanctuaries campaign run by the 
Pew Charitable Trusts (a non-governmental organisation 
based in Washington DC and Philadelphia), was quoted 
as expecting approval: “I’m feeling really good about the 
proposals this time round. The science is settled. There is 
international will to do this”.1 
Figure 1. Polar projection: Antarctic MPA proposals
In the Bremerhaven meeting, however, the proposals 
did not fare as well as it was hoped. Russia, backed 
by Ukraine, continued to oppose the action. Although 
presumably concerned about fishing, the Russian/Ukrainian 
opposition to the MPA proposals was couched in legal 
CCAMLR
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